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Note
Preparation to Infringe after MedImmune v.
Genentech: Why the Federal Circuit’s Declaratory
Judgment Jurisdiction Test is Still Too Stringent
Hugh D. Brown*
I. INTRODUCTION
MedImmune v. Genentech1 significantly lowered the bar for
patent declaratory judgment jurisdiction. Before MedImmune,
the Federal Circuit’s two-pronged reasonable apprehension of
suit test2 required a plaintiff (1) to have a reasonable basis for
believing that it would be sued for infringement by a patentee,
and (2) to have engaged in meaningful preparation to infringe.
The Supreme Court’s ruling removed the test’s first prong,
requiring a potential infringer to actually anticipate a suit for
infringement.3 The case did not explicitly address the second
prong of the test, which required declaratory judgment
plaintiffs to show that their infringing products were at an
advanced stage of development.
This Note argues that the Federal Circuit should lower the
bar on the second prong of the reasonable apprehension of suit
test, granting declaratory judgment jurisdiction on a lower
showing of preparation to infringe. Section II describes the
background to MedImmune, beginning with the Federal

 2010 Hugh D. Brown.
* Hugh D. Brown is a J.D. candidate at the University of Minnesota Law
School. He would like to thank his family.
1. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007).
2. See Gen-Probe Inc. v. Vysis, Inc., 359 F.3d 1376, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2004),
overruled by MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 133.
3. MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 132 n.11.
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Circuit’s reasonable apprehension of suit test. It then describes
the MedImmune holding and the subsequent effect of the
holding on Federal Circuit approaches to subject matter
jurisdiction. Section III analyzes these effects in light of
MedImmune and the purposes of the Declaratory Judgment
Act4 itself. Based on the purposes behind the Declaratory
Judgment Act, the influence of MedImmune, and good policy,
this note concludes that the Federal Circuit’s test is still too
stringent and declaratory judgment plaintiffs ought to be able
to sue to ascertain their rights in a broader range of
circumstances.
II. THE IMPACT OF MEDIMMUNE ON DECLARATORY
JUDGMENT JURISDICTION
A. THE DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACT AND STANDING
Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution
provides that the judicial power of the United States extends to
cases and controversies.5 This provision prohibits federal courts
from issuing advisory opinions or opinions on hypothetical
facts.6 Therefore, for a plaintiff to have standing, he must
allege an actual injury which is “fairly traceable to the
defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be
redressed by the requested relief,”7 rather than a hypothetical
future injury. Where the injury alleged is a prohibition on
allegedly legal activity, such as an invalid patent or an
unconstitutional law, this language presents litigants with an
unpleasant choice: they can obey the unlawful prohibition and
refrain from allegedly lawful behavior, in which case they
would lack the injury necessary to avail themselves of relief in
an Article III court, or they could disobey the prohibition and
risk the consequences if the prohibition was later found to be
lawful.
The Declaratory Judgment Act was designed to ameliorate
the effects of this doctrine.8 It provides:
4. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2006).
5. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; see also U.S. Nat’l Bank of Or. v. Indep. Ins.
Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 446 (1993).
6. U.S. Nat’l Bank, 508 U.S. at 446.
7. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).
8. See Willing v. Chi. Auditorium Ass’n, 277 U.S. 274, 288–90 (1928),
superseded by statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, as recognized in Calderon v. Ashmus,
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In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction . . . any court of
the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may
declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party
seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be
sought.9

Therefore, the Declaratory Judgment Act allows the courts
to hear cases involving injuries which are merely threatened,
rather than actually inflicted.
The Declaratory Judgment Act is particularly important
for patent law. Patent infringement carries the threat of
liability for treble damages.10 Without the ability to sue for a
declaratory judgment, a potential infringer has no choice but to
lose a business opportunity or indefinitely accrue potential
liability for infringement in the course of that opportunity. This
uncertainty allows patentees to put heavy pressure on potential
infringers to pay license fees even in cases where a patentee
has a questionable claim. The Federal Circuit described the
resulting situation as a “danse macabre” where the patentee
brandished a “Damoclean threat with a sheathed sword”:
Guerrilla-like, the patent owner attempts extra-judicial patent
enforcement with scare-the-customer-and-run tactics that infect the
competitive environment of the business community with uncertainty
and insecurity. Before the Act, competitors victimized by that tactic
were rendered helpless and immobile so long as the patent owner
refused to grasp the nettle and sue. After the Act, those competitors
were no longer restricted to an in terrorem choice between the
incurrence of a growing potential liability for patent infringement and
abandonment of their enterprises; they could clear the air by suing for
a judgment that would settle the conflict of interests.11

Declaratory judgment removes this threat where there is a
conflict between the patentee’s patent and the potential
infringer’s product.
The Declaratory Judgment Act is a procedural tool,
however, and only extends as far as the Constitution permits.12
A case or controversy must still exist.13 As Aetna v. Haworth
pointed out, Congress may provide for new procedures for the

523 U.S. 740, 745 (1998).
9. 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a).
10. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006); see also Biacore, AB v. Thermo Bioanalysis
Corp., 79 F. Supp. 2d 422, 471 (D. Del. 1999).
11. Arrowhead Indus. Water, Inc. v. Ecolchem, Inc., 846 F.2d 731, 735
(Fed. Cir. 1988) (internal citations removed).
12. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 239–40 (1937).
13. Id.
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adjudication and enforcement of rights, but it may not expand
those rights beyond the limits of Article III.14 The
constitutional requirements for declaratory judgment,
therefore, are the same as those for standing in general.15
There must be a controversy that is appropriate for judicial
determination, i.e. not “academic or moot.”16 The dispute must
be “definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties
having adverse legal interests.”17
B. FEDERAL CIRCUIT JURISDICTIONAL DOCTRINE
Article III limits the situations in which a potential
infringer may challenge the validity of a patent via declaratory
judgment. The Federal Circuit has developed a doctrine to
determine when declaratory judgment jurisdiction exists for
patent cases. Prior to MedImmune, the test, known as the
reasonable apprehension of suit test, was two-pronged.18 The
Federal Circuit first applied this test in Arrowhead Industrial
Water, Inc. v. Ecolochem, Inc.19 First, the patentee must have
given some indication to the potential infringer that the
patentee would sue if the potentially infringing behavior
continued.20 Second, the potential infringer must have
produced or prepared to produce the potentially infringing
product.21
Most of the litigation in these cases has focused on the first
prong of the reasonable apprehension of suit test, which
regulates the actions of the patentee. However, the Federal
Circuit has also mentioned the second prong in depth in, for
example, Sierra Applied Sciences, Inc. v. Advanced Energy
Industries, Inc.22 In Sierra, the court consolidated the current
language of “immediacy and reality” by focusing on its
precedents in Lang v. Pacific Marine and Supply Co.23 and

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
1993).
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id. at 240.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 240–41.
BP Chems. Ltd. v. Union Carbide Corp., 4 F.3d 975, 978 (Fed. Cir.
846 F.2d 731, 736 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
Id.
Id.
363 F.3d 1361, 1378–80 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
895 F.2d 761 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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Teletronics Pacing Systems, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc.24
In Lang we held that that immediacy was absent where the ship at
issue would not be ready for at least nine months and the owners of
the ship had not engaged in any marketing activities.
Teletronics implicitly tied the concept of “reality” to whether the
design of the potentially infringing subject of the declaratoryjudgment suit was substantially fixed, particularly with respect to its
potentially-infringing characteristics, on the date the complaint was
filed.25

The Federal Circuit justified its approach by pointing out
that variability in a potentially infringing product increased
the chance that the product would change before release,
rendering the opinion on the previous version purely advisory,
in violation of Article III.26 Because of this concern, the Federal
Circuit has tended to require a high degree of product
development before granting jurisdiction where the second
prong is in issue. In Lang, the court held that jurisdictional
immediacy requirements were not fulfilled when the
“infringing ship’s hull was still nine months from completion
when the complaint was filed.”27 There was no indication that
the design of the hull was susceptible to change or that the hull
might not be finished. Yet the plaintiff was refused the chance
to gain a determination of his rights before expending the
resources necessary to complete the ship. Lang demonstrates
the high degree of development the Federal Circuit requires
before granting jurisdiction.
In several other cases, district courts, following the Federal
Circuit’s lead, denied declaratory judgment jurisdiction in
situations where potential infringers had incurred considerable
cost in preparation of potentially infringing products. In Duhn
Oil Tool, Inc. v. Cooper Cameron Corp.,28 the court refused
declaratory judgment jurisdiction to an alleged infringer whose
product was still at the design stage.29 The court stated,
“Cameron asks the Court to determine that Cameron’s Patent
Pending Design, whether in practice, or in theory, does not
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
2007).
29.

982 F.2d 1520 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
Sierra, 363 F.3d at 1379.
Id.
Lang, 895 F.2d at 765.
No. 1:05-cv-01411-OWW-GSA, 2007 WL 3335008 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 9,
Id. at *7.
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infringe Duhn’s ‘925 Patent. . . . No infringement is alleged. As
yet, no adverse legal relationship exists.”30 Partially on this
basis,31 the court refused to grant declaratory judgment
jurisdiction, and the plaintiff was unable to determine whether
its new design infringed an existing patent before proceeding to
manufacture.
In Shaunnessey v. Monteris Medical, Inc.,32 the court held
that a potential infringer who had not yet obtained approval on
its medical device was not entitled to declaratory judgment
since it was unclear whether the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) would require design change.33 The
potential infringer was several years away from submitting the
device for FDA approval, however, and significant costs had
been incurred in the development of the product.34
In Mega Lift Systems, LLC v. MGM Well Services, Inc.,35
the court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss the
plaintiff’s declaratory judgment suit where the plaintiff had
substantially completed the design of the product, but had not
yet finalized the design or begun to manufacture or sell the
product. The court stated, “Under these facts, the Court cannot
determine whether Mega Lift is ready to infringe tomorrow or
next year.”36 The court decided that, under these
circumstances, the dispute was neither “immediate” nor
“real.”37 These cases demonstrate that in a large number of
cases, both before and after MedImmune, district courts have
adopted a restrictive approach to declaratory judgment
jurisdiction.
C. THE EFFECT OF MEDIMMUNE.
MedImmune, decided January 9, 2007, lowered the bar
established by the reasonable apprehension of suit test.
MedImmune, manufacturer of Synagis, “a drug designed to
prevent respiratory tract disease in young children,” entered
30. Id. at *6.
31. The court also cited the fact that the USPTO had the power to alter
the design, and, therefore, it was not necessarily fixed. Id.
32. 554 F. Supp. 2d 1321 (M.D. Fla. 2008).
33. Id. at 1324.
34. See id.
35. No. 6:08 CV 420, 2009 WL 1851919 (E.D. Tex. Jun. 29, 2009).
36. Id. at *4.
37. Id.
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into a license agreement with Genentech, paying royalties to
produce products covered by an existing patent and a pending
patent.38 MedImmune agreed to pay royalties on sales of
“licensed products” in exchange for the right to make, use, and
sell them.39 In 2001, the pending patent matured, and
Genentech sent a letter to MedImmune expressing its belief
that Synagis was covered by the patent and requesting
royalties under the license agreement.40 MedImmune
disagreed, but given the potential liability for treble damages
and attorney’s fees, as well as for an injunction against selling
Synagis (which had accounted for 80% of MedImmune’s
revenue since 1999), MedImmune decided to pay under
protest.41 MedImmune filed suit seeking a declaratory
judgment of noninfringement of Genentech’s patent or
invalidity of the patent.42 The district court granted
Genentech’s motion to dismiss, and the Federal Circuit
affirmed, reasoning that the license agreement had
“obliterate[d] any reasonable apprehension that [MedImmune]
will be sued for infringement.”43
The Supreme Court reversed. It held that MedImmune was
“not required, insofar as Article III [was] concerned, to break or
terminate its 1997 license agreement before seeking a
declaratory judgment in federal court that the underlying
patent is invalid, unenforceable, or not infringed.”44 The Court
reviewed the history of the Declaratory Judgment Act in the
context of its Article III roots.45 The Court stated that the Act
required a dispute that is “definite and concrete, touching the
legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests; and
that [is] real and substantial, and admit[s] of specific relief
through a decree of a conclusive character, as distinguished
from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a
hypothetical state of facts.”46 The fact that MedImmune’s own

38. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 121 (2007).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 122.
42. Id. at 123.
43. Id. at 122.
44. Id. at 137.
45. Id. at 120.
46. Id. at 127 (quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240–
41 (1937)).
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actions eliminated the imminent threat of harm was
irrelevant—the conflict was still real, and the fact that
MedImmune was paying royalties was injury enough to provide
a basis for declaratory judgment jurisdiction.47 Arguably the
most important part of the MedImmune opinion came in a
footnote, which explained that the Federal Circuit’s reasonable
apprehension of suit test was inconsistent with a previous
Supreme Court case:
[Altvater]48 . . . contradict[s] the Federal Circuit’s “reasonable
apprehension of suit” test . . . . The reasonable-apprehension-of-suit
test also conflicts with our decisions in Maryland Casualty Co. v.
Pacific Coal & Oil Co., . . . where jurisdiction obtained even though
the collision-victim defendant could not have sued the declaratoryjudgment plaintiff-insurer without first obtaining a judgment against
the insured. . . .49

The Federal Circuit took the Supreme Court at its word
and altered the reasonable apprehension of suit test in
subsequent cases. The first prong was altered quickly. In
SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectonics Inc., the Federal Circuit
recognized that MedImmune represented a rejection of the
reasonable apprehension of suit test, and adopted the
proposition that “Article III jurisdiction may be met where the
patentee takes a position that puts the declaratory judgment
plaintiff in the position of either pursuing arguably illegal
behavior or abandoning that which he claims a right to do.”50
The court declined to “define the outer boundaries” of

47. Id. at 123.
48. The Court described the Altvater opinion in more depth:
Altvater v. Freeman [319 U.S. 359 (1943)] held that a licensee’s failure to
cease payment did not render non-justiciable a dispute over the validity of
the patent. . . . “The fact that royalties were being paid did not make this
a ‘difference or dispute of a hypothetical or abstract character.’” The
royalties “were being paid under protest and under the compulsion of an
injunction decree,” and “[u]nless the injunction decree were modified, the
only other course [of action] was to defy it, and to risk not only actual but
treble damages in infringement suits. [T]he requirements of [a] case or
controversy are met where payment of a claim is demanded as of right
and where payment is made, but where the involuntary or coercive nature
of the exaction preserves the right to recover the sums paid or to
challenge the legality of the claim.”
MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 130–31 (2007).
49. Id. at 132–33 n.11.
50. SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372, 1381 (Fed.
Cir. 2007).
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jurisdiction over declaratory judgment claims.51 SanDisk was a
start, but left lower courts without much guidance. Four days
later in Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Novartis
Pharmaceuticals Corp., the Federal Circuit suggested that an
“all the circumstances” test was the appropriate test for
declaratory judgment jurisdiction.52 Noting that an Article III
controversy could be found where the plaintiff had
demonstrated an injury in fact that could be redressed in court,
the court held that the same standard applied in a declaratory
judgment suit, and reversed the dismissal of the suit for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.53 The case was an easy one,
however, and the court would probably have reached the same
result under its reasonable apprehension test prior to
MedImmune.54 The case established the importance of the
Article III language. In subsequent cases, the court seems to
have settled on a ‘standing-lite’ test, the court’s new relaxed
standing requirement, which grants standing when the injury
suffered by the plaintiff meets the test of “immediacy and
reality”:55
This “immediacy and reality” inquiry can be viewed through the lens
of standing. To satisfy standing, the plaintiff must allege (1) an
injury-in-fact, i.e., a harm that is “‘concrete’ and actual or imminent,
not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical,’” (2) that is “fairly traceable” to the
defendant’s conduct, and (3) redressable by a favorable decision.56

MedImmune’s impact on the second prong of the
reasonable apprehension of suit was less obvious. The Supreme
Court had not explicitly indicated its disapproval, as it had
with the first prong.57 The Court’s indication that declaratory
judgment ought to be available in a wider range of
circumstances, however, was taken as a suggestion that the bar
for fulfilling the second prong should be lowered too,

51. Id.
52. 482 F.3d 1330, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
53. Id. at 1345–46.
54. Teva Pharmaceuticals had already produced and marketed the
potentially infringing product, and Novartis had brought an infringement suit
against Teva on related products. Id. at 1334–35.
55. Prasco, LLC v. Medicis Pharm. Corp., 537 F.3d 1329, 1338 (Fed. Cir.
2008).
56. Id.
57. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 132–33 n.11
(2007).
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particularly in Benitec Australia, Ltd. v. Nucleonics, Inc.,58 the
first case to deal with the second prong. In Benitec, Nucleonics
sued for a judgment of invalidity of Benitec’s patent.59 The
Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of the
declaratory judgment action on the basis that Nucleonics had
“failed to show that its future plans meet the immediacy and
reality . . . necessary to support a justiciable controversy.”60
First, Nucleonics had only talked with potential customers and
executed a confidentiality agreement.61 The court stated that
“to allow such a scant showing . . . would be to allow nearly
anyone who so desired to challenge a patent.”62 Second,
“Nucleonics had provided insufficient information for a court to
assess whether Nucleonics’s future animal work would be
infringing or not.”63 Third, the patentee had decided in the
interim that the technology did not in fact infringe the patent.64
The first and second rationales were the most important. The
court recognized the overruling of the reasonable apprehension
of suit test, and used the SanDisk test, stating that “Article III
jurisdiction may be met where the patentee takes a position
that puts the declaratory judgment plaintiff in the position of
either pursuing arguably illegal behavior or abandoning that
which he claims a right to do.”65 The court also used the
“immediacy and reality” language of Sierra, applying it for the
first time to a case where the party whose inaction deprived the
court of jurisdiction was the plaintiff, not the defendant.66 This
touched on the second prong of the reasonable apprehension of
suit test and suggested that MedImmune might have affected
this aspect of declaratory judgment jurisdiction too.
The Federal Circuit more explicitly explored the second
prong of the reasonable apprehension of suit test in Cat Tech
58. 495 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
59. Id. at 1342. The court’s opinion does not give sufficient information to
determine how far Nucleonics had progressed with its potentially infringing
products.
60. Id. at 1348–49.
61. Id. at 1349.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1344 (quoting SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480
F.3d 1372, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).
66. Id. at 1348 (citing MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118,
127 (2007)).
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LLC v. TubeMaster. Noting that it had yet to consider the effect
of MedImmune on the second prong,67 the court stated:
[A]lthough MedImmune articulated a “more lenient legal standard”
for the availability of declaratory relief in patent cases the issue of
whether there has been meaningful preparation to conduct
potentially infringing activity remains an important element in the
totality of circumstances which must be considered in determining
whether a declaratory judgment is appropriate.68

Following Benitec, the court decided that the immediacy
and reality tests were appropriate for the second prong.69
Analyzing “immediacy,” it found that “[c]onstitutionally
mandated immediacy requirements have been satisfied because
once the threat of liability . . . has been lifted, it appears likely
that TubeMaster can . . . solicit and fill orders.”70 Analyzing
“reality,” it found that the potentially infringing product was
“substantially fixed,” and that “TubeMaster does not expect to
make substantial modifications.”71 Therefore, the dispute was
“real.”72 Cat Tech was ambiguous on the effect of MedImmune
on the second prong of the reasonable apprehension of suit test.
While the court did not rule out the possibility that
MedImmune was a factor, Cat Tech would most likely have
been decided as it was regardless of MedImmune.73
A recent Colorado district court decision provides more
guidance on the effect of MedImmune on the second prong. In
67. Cat Tech LLC v. TubeMaster, 528 F.3d 871, 880 (Fed. Cir. 2008). The
court acknowledged that it had addressed the actions of a potential infringer
in Benitec, but maintained that it had not directly addressed the “continued
viability of the second prong of this court’s pre-MedImmune test.” Id. at 880
n.3.
68. Id. (citations omitted).
69. Id. at 880 (“If a declaratory judgment plaintiff has not taken
significant, concrete steps to conduct infringing activity, the dispute is neither
‘immediate’ nor ‘real’ and the requirements for justiciability have not been
met.”) (citing Lang v. Pac. Marine and Supply Co., 895 F.2d 761, 764 (Fed. Cir.
1990)).
70. Id. at 882.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. The court compared the stage of development to the technology in
Sierra, decided prior to MedImmune, and decided on that basis that the
technology in Cat Tech was sufficiently advanced to merit jurisdiction. Id. at
882–83 (“Unlike the technology involved in . . . Sierra . . . TubeMaster’s
technology is ‘substantially fixed’. . . . The dispute with Cat Tech is ‘real,’ not
hypothetical, because it appears likely that, once the cloud of liability for
infringement is eliminated, the accused products can be produced without
significant design change.”).
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City of Aurora, Colo. v. PS Systems,74 the court held that cases
decided prior to MedImmune were no longer valid on the second
prong of the reasonable apprehension test.75 As this case and
others show, the effect of MedImmune on the requirement of
preparation to infringe is still an open question.
III. THE BAR TO DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
JURISDICTION IS STILL TOO HIGH.
A. CRITICISM OF THE REASONABLE APPREHENSION OF SUIT TEST
PRE-MEDIMMUNE
Before MedImmune, the Federal Circuit’s approach had
been criticized on several grounds. First, the test was applied
with unreasonable formalism.76 The Federal Circuit has too
often applied the letter of the reasonable apprehension of suit
test, with too little consideration for its normative purposes. In
Shell Oil Co. v. Amoco Corp., for example, the Federal Circuit
affirmed the 12(b)(1) dismissal of a declaratory judgment suit
against Amoco.77 Shell initiated licensing discussions when
deciding whether to pursue a course of conduct which might
arguably have fallen under Amoco’s patent.78 When the
discussions broke down, Amoco suggested that Shell consider a
declaratory judgment action.79 However, Amoco filed a 12(b)(1)
motion in response to the action when it was filed.80 Despite the
breakdown of the licensing discussions, the Federal Circuit
affirmed the lower court’s grant of the motion on the basis that
“Amoco might never have sued, either because the validity of
its patent was doubtful or its infringement argument was too
weak.”81 The conflict in Shell Oil was real enough for the
parties to begin licensing discussions and abandon them on the
basis of inability to agree over their rights regarding a certain
74. No. 07-CV-02371-WYD-BNB, 2008 WL 4377505 (D. Colo. 2008).
75. Id. at *10 (“Finally, I note that those cases were decided under the
‘reasonable apprehension’ test which appears to be no longer valid in light of
the more lenient standard articulated in MedImmune.”).
76. Lorelei Ritchie de Larena, Re-evalutaing Declaratory Judgment
Jurisdiction in Intellectual Property Disputes, 83 IND. L.J. 957, 979 (2008).
77. 970 F.2d 885, 886 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (quoted in de Larena, supra note
76, at 979).
78. Id. at 886.
79. Id. at 887.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 889 (emphasis added).
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patent. Despite this clearly concrete legal dispute between the
parties, which would have been solved by a judgment on the
merits, the Federal Circuit denied jurisdiction by a rigid
application of the reasonable apprehension of suit test.82
Second, the test has been inconsistent. Before
MedImmune, the Federal Circuit usually used the reasonable
apprehension of suit test. However, it has also used a “totality
of the circumstances” test.83 Accordingly, “[the Federal Circuit
applied] the standard(s) formalistically, but at the same time
mix[ed] in other tests and versions without clearly articulating
or applying a single test that would settle the reasonable
expectations of parties. Unfortunately, this goes against the
normative values of consistency and reliability of
jurisprudence.”84 Also, more importantly, the court used its test
to block parties like Shell from settling their rights and
responsibilities vis-à-vis potentially infringed patents.
B. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S ANALYSIS POST-MEDIMMUNE.
The court’s analysis in Cat Tech was much more similar to
its pre-MedImmune analysis in Sierra than it was different.
Sierra focused on immediacy and reality, and suggested that
the plaintiff’s infringing conduct must not be forthcoming too
far in the future,85 and must not be susceptible to much change
before taking its final form.86 Cat Tech had similar
requirements. It required that a plaintiff have taken
significant, concrete steps to conduct infringing activity, and it
also required immediacy.87 While there was language that
suggested that the court might be open to an easier standard,88
no such standard was explicitly articulated.
Such an adherence to the old standard is inappropriate for
many reasons. First, the unreasonably high bar is contrary to
82. See id.
83. de Larena, supra note 76, at 977–78.
84. Id.
85. Sierra Applied Sci., Inc. v. Advanced Energy Indus., Inc., 363 F.3d
1361, 1378–79 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
86. Id. at 1379.
87. Cat Tech LLC v. TubeMaster, Inc., 528 F.3d 871, 881–82 (Fed. Cir.
2008).
88. “[A]lthough a party need not have engaged in the actual manufacture
or sale of a potentially infringing product to obtain a declaratory judgment of
non-infringement, there must be a showing of ‘meaningful preparation.’” Id. at
881.
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the spirit, if not the explicit language, of MedImmune. Second,
it is also contrary to the traditional standing doctrine which
forms the basis for declaratory judgment jurisdiction.89 Finally,
good policy suggests that the bar should be lower.
MedImmune only explicitly challenged the first prong of
the reasonable apprehension of suit test.90 The Supreme
Court’s decision in the circumstances, however, supports
lowering the bar for the second prong, too. The MedImmune
plaintiff’s own actions (i.e., complying with his license
agreement) rendered suit against him impossible. Despite this,
the Court allowed him to seek a declaration of his rights before
he risked such a suit by taking the action which would have
allowed the suit to proceed. In other words, the Court did not
force the plaintiff to subject himself to the possibility of suit
before it allowed him to sue for a declaration of his rights.91
Declaratory judgment plaintiffs whose suits are dismissed
under the immediacy and reality requirements contained in the
second prong of the reasonable apprehension of suit test92 have
a similar quandary, and so they seek a declaration of their
rights before their product reaches a point of development
where they may be sued for infringement. The MedImmune
Court stated strongly that this should be allowed: “There is no
dispute that [the declaratory judgment requirements] would
have been satisfied if petitioner had taken the final step of
refusing to make royalty payments [and thereby subjecting
himself to suit].”93 The plaintiff’s failure to subject himself to
suit did not defeat this exercise of jurisdiction. Where an action
of the plaintiff was the only thing preventing the suit for
infringement, the Supreme Court stated “[W]e do not require a
89. See supra notes 1011 and accompanying text.
90. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 132 n.11 (2007)
(“Altvater . . . contradict[s] the Federal Circuit’s ‘reasonable apprehension of
suit’ test.”).
91. The Supreme Court, of course, did not analyze this point under the
reasonable apprehension of suit test. However, it allowed jurisdiction even
when the plaintiff had not taken action to reach the point where it was
infringing a patent.
92. See, e.g., Shaunnessey v. Monteris Med., Inc., 554 F. Supp. 2d 1321
(M.D. Fla. 2008) (dismissing patentee’s declaratory judgment action for lack of
immediacy and ruling that where defendant had not yet obtained approval on
its class III medical device, the “immediacy” requirement of an actual
controversy was not satisfied, since it was speculative as to whether the FDA
would require design changes).
93. MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 128.
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plaintiff to expose himself to liability before bringing suit to
challenge the basis for the threat.”94 However, this is exactly
what the Federal Circuit requires when it forces a potential
infringer to develop a product to the point where he may be
sued before it allows a court to declare his rights vis-à-vis the
patent. MedImmune allows a plaintiff to be sure of his rights
before subjecting himself to suit. It should make no difference
whether he is protected from suit by payment of license fees or
by a product which has not yet reached the point where an
infringement suit may be brought. Article III standing
requirements, rather than those imposed by the Federal
Circuit’s patent declaratory judgment jurisdiction, ought to be
the only requirements.
The language used in MedImmune supports this
conclusion. The Supreme Court describes declaratory judgment
in terms of traditional standing doctrine, rather than
traditional Federal Circuit patent analysis.95 It reiterates that
“the phrase ‘case of actual controversy’ in the Act refers to the
type of ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies’ that are justiciable under
Article III.”96 While the Supreme Court does use a patent case
(Altvater) to demonstrate the final proposition, the cases that
lead up to this proposition are not patent cases. This suggests
that the Supreme Court is promulgating a patent declaratory
judgment standard that more closely follows traditional
standing doctrine than the Federal Circuit has been doing so
far.
MedImmune’s implicit suggestion that the Federal Circuit
should follow Article III’s standing doctrine more closely is
welcome, but the reminder should not have been necessary.
Patent rights have historically been problematic and
uncertainty surrounding them was an issue even in 1934.97 The
Declaratory Judgment Act was partially intended to alleviate
this uncertainty.98 The Supreme Court had repeatedly decided
94. Id. at 128–29. While the court was referring to government
enforcement, it is clear that this was the relevant question regardless of where
the threat of force came from.
95. Id. at 127.
96. Id.
97. See supra notes 1011 and accompanying text.
98. Lisa A. Dolak, Power or Prudence: Toward a Better Standard for
Evaluating Patent Litigants’ Access to the Declaratory Judgment Remedy, 41
U.S.F. L. REV. 407, 408 n.6 (2007). Dolak discusses congressional hearings on
previous declaratory judgment bills. Bills were intended to remove
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that the Declaratory Judgment Act should be interpreted to
grant jurisdiction to the extent allowed by the Constitution.99
This suggests that the requirements for declaratory judgment
jurisdiction in patent cases should parallel the requirements for
Article III standing.
C. THE JURISDICTIONAL GAP
Exactly how wide is the gap between Federal Circuit
declaratory judgment jurisdiction, and traditional Article III
standing doctrine as applied to declaratory judgment actions in
general? Aetna’s formulation of the declaratory judgment
standard is difficult to apply in a concrete and consistent
manner.100 Rather, the Supreme Court has stated that whether
specific facts constitute an actual controversy must be
determined on a case by case basis.101 Therefore it is impossible
to draw a bright line distinction between the practices of the
Federal Circuit in patent cases and courts who interpret Article
III standing in other kinds of cases. It is possible, however, to
show some general distinctions.
First, the Constitution does not mandate the reasonable
apprehension of suit test.102 “The Federal Circuit has
uncertainty, and patents were explicitly referred to in Senate testimony
regarding a previous bill:
In his senate testimony, Professor Sunderland described the plight of
the alleged patent infringer, as follows: I assert that I have a right to
use a certain patent. You claim that you have a patent. What am I
going to do about it? There is no way I can litigate my right, which I
claim, to use that device, except by going ahead and using it, and you
[the patent holder] can sit back as long as you please and let me run
up just as high a bill of damages as you wish to have me run up, and
then you may sue me for the damages, and I am ruined, having acted
all the time in good faith and on my best judgment, but having no
way in the world to find out whether I had a right to use that device
or not.
Id. (quoting 1928 Hearings on H.R. 5623 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 70th Cong., 34–35 (1928) (testimony of Professor
Edson R. Sunderland)).
99. MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 126 (citing Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth,
300 U.S. 227 (1937)).
100. McCahill v. Borough of Fox Chapel, 438 F.2d 213, 215 (3d Cir. 1971)
(“The considerations, while catholic, are not concrete.”).
101. Simmonds Aerocessories, Ltd. v. Elastic Stop Nut Corp. of America,
257 F.2d 485, 489 (3d Cir. 1958) (“Whether there is an actual controversy
within the meaning of the Act is a question which turns on the facts of each
individual case.”).
102. Dolak, supra note 98, at 421.
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recognized that the Act’s actual controversy requirement is
constitutionally mandated and that the Act neither confers
jurisdiction on the federal courts nor imposes jurisdictional
requirements above and beyond those compelled by the
Constitution.”103 As Dolak also points out, however, the Federal
Circuit has repeatedly used its reasonable apprehension of suit
test to determine whether an actual controversy exists, “thus
effectively equating its test with the constitutional minimum
requirements.”104 This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that
many Federal Circuit members have disclaimed the
jurisdictional underpinning of the reasonable apprehension of
suit test.105 Judge Gajarsa wrote: “Article III does not compel
[the reasonable apprehension test].”106
Second, the reasonable apprehension of suit test confuses
the jurisdictional and discretionary prongs of declaratory
judgment.107 The Federal Circuit has recognized that there is a
discretionary
element
to
the
declaratory
judgment
jurisdictional question.108 Much more frequently, however, it
has taken policy considerations into account when deciding the
jurisdictional elements of declaratory judgment, rather than
the discretionary element. As Dolak says:
[T]he problem is not that the Federal Circuit has taken policy into
account in evaluating declaratory judgment justiciability. The
problem is the extent to which it has permitted policy to influence the
first step—the constitutional or jurisdictional analysis—as evidenced
by its justifications for, and application of, its two-step reasonable
apprehension/infringer activity test.109

Dolak also points out several instances in which the court
has “unequivocally linked its test to both the language of the
Act and to the applicable constitutional constraints.”110 In Teva,
the court stated:
In order for this case to be one fit for judicial review, Teva must be
able to demonstrate that it has a reasonable apprehension of
103. Id. at 420 (emphasis added).
104. Id. at 421.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. See id. at 422.
108. Cat Tech LLC v. TubeMaster, Inc., 528 F.3d 871, 883 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(“Even assuming that the immediacy and reality prerequisites for declaratory
judgment relief have been met, the district court’s exercise of its declaratory
judgment authority is discretionary.”).
109. Dolak, supra note 98, at 425.
110. Id. at 423.
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imminent suit. Whether there is an “actual controversy” between
parties having adverse legal interests depends upon whether the facts
alleged show that there is a substantial controversy between the
parties of “sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of
a declaratory judgment.” This requirement of imminence reflects the
Article III mandate that the injury in fact be “concrete,” and “actual
or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” . . . We do not think that
the cases cited by Teva support the proposition that the reasonable
apprehension of suit prong of our traditional two-part test is not a
constitutional requirement.111

Such conflation of jurisdictional and prudential
considerations has developed a test that has been applied
under the assumption that it is mandated by the Constitution.
Not only has the test achieved quasi-constitutional force, it has
become unnecessarily strict by formulating it not just on the
basis of Article III, but also on the basis of every possible policy
argument which can be made against easy declaratory
judgment jurisdiction.112 While making decisions on the basis of
these policy considerations is appropriate in some cases, it is
not appropriate in every case.113 This conflation of policy and
jurisdiction arguments has not only resulted in an
unnecessarily high bar to declaratory judgment for potential
infringers, it has also made this high bar more difficult to
overcome with jurisdictional arguments. If the discretionary
prong is separated from the jurisdictional prong, plaintiffs can
respond to each with appropriate arguments. As it is, the
waters have been muddied. Conflation of the prudential and

111. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., 395 F.3d 1324, 1333–35 (Fed.
Cir. 2005) (second emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
112. The three arguments Dolak raises in favor of a narrow declaratory
judgment jurisdiction standard are (1) respect for the patent system, (2)
encouragement to design around patents, (3) encouragement to negotiate. See
Dolak, supra note 98, at 434–35 (“[R]eadily subjecting patents to declaratory
judgment attack would tend to undermine the respect Congress created the
Federal Circuit to engender, for litigation raises questions about, and
potentially impairs, a patent’s validity.”). See also Slimfold Mfg. Co. v.
Kinkead Indus., Inc., 932 F.2d 1453, 1457 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“Designing around
patents is . . . one of the ways in which the patent system works to the
advantage of the public in promoting progress in the useful arts, its
constitutional purpose. Inherent in our claim-based patent system is also the
principle that the protected invention is what the claims say it is, and thus
that infringement can be avoided by avoiding the language of the claims.”);
Century Indus., Inc. v. Wenter Corp., 851 F. Supp. 1260, 1264–65 (S.D. Ind.
1994) (dismissing declaratory judgment claim in part because the parties were
“still engaged in discussions aimed at resolving the potential dispute”).
113. Dolak, supra note 98, at 435–36.
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jurisdictional prongs also destroys predictability114 and is
contrary to the language of the Declaratory Judgment Act.115
It is clear that a controversy as described in Article III can
exist between the parties even when the conduct is not as
immediate and certain as mandated by the Federal Circuit. In
cases outside the patent realm, preparation to engage in the
prohibited conduct is enough to get jurisdiction over the
declaratory judgment action challenging the prohibition.116 A
plaintiff challenging a criminal statute does not even have to
show that he has prepared to commit the prohibited behavior
before he may mount a challenge to the act.117 While there are
certainly differences between criminal and patent cases, these
differences affect the policy rationales behind granting
jurisdiction, not the constitutional underpinnings of
jurisdiction. The language of federal decisions has repeatedly
said that plaintiffs should not have to infringe in order to get
an adjudication of their rights.118 The necessity of meaningful
preparation, which may frequently expose a plaintiff to an
infringement suit, renders this protection useless. In
Shaunnessey, the district court declined to exercise jurisdiction
prior to submission of the FDA device approval, which the court
argued could have required changes to the device.119 As the
plaintiffs argued, however, no potential change would have
rendered the challenged device non-infringing.120 Therefore,
there was a high practical likelihood that the controversy was
real. Under Article III analysis, this is sufficient to grant
jurisdiction.121
114. Id. at 433 (“[T]o the extent that the courts inconsistently assign
jurisdictional . . . weight to the same or similar facts in declaratory judgment
justiciability determinations, outcomes are less predictable.”).
115. Id. (“[T]he Declaratory Judgment Act on its face precludes the
consideration of prudential factors in the jurisdictional calculus, as the
language of Congress made distinct the Act’s jurisdictional and discretionary
aspects.”).
116. Hertzog, Calamari & Gleason v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 933 F.
Supp. 246, 250 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
117. See Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923) (allowing an immigrant
to challenge an anti-alien land owning statute before any attempts were made
to actually own land).
118. See, e.g., id.
119. Shaunnessey v. Monteris Med., Inc., 554 F. Supp. 2d 1321, 1324 (M.D.
Fla. 2008).
120. Id.
121. See 10B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE &
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D. POLICY AND THE REASONABLE APPREHENSION OF SUIT TEST.
While there are policy reasons to restrict declaratory
judgment actions,122 there are also significant policy reasons to
encourage them. The most compelling of these reasons is that
the declaratory judgment remedy was designed to prevent
plaintiffs from suffering significant injuries before gaining an
adjudication of their rights.123 The traditional formulation says
that these injuries constitute judicially awarded damages for
infringement.124 However, an examination of the cases in which
the courts have denied jurisdiction on the basis of the Federal
Circuit’s test shows that declaratory judgment plaintiffs can
often be forced to develop an infringing product to the point of
near completion before gaining an adjudication of their rights,
which process may ultimately find their product to be
infringing. In this case, there is an argument to be made that
the injury suffered constitutes the investment made between
the period a party first asserts its right to a determination and
the time that its product is found to be infringing.
Lang, Duhn Oil Tool, and Shaunnessey125 demonstrate the
costs of denying declaratory judgment in situations where
plaintiffs may have products into which they have already put
substantial resources, and which will require substantial
further resources to finish. Such a decision denies the plaintiff
the chance to (1) cease production of the infringing device and
use the resources for another purpose, (2) design around the
patent, or (3) evaluate the costs of getting a license before
deciding whether to accept these costs or not as part of the
entire cost of bringing the product to market. This wastes the
resources needed to complete the product when an ultimately
infringing product is completed, and the resources used to
begin the product when an actually non-infringing product is
PROCEDURE § 2757 (3d ed. 2004) (“[T]he practical likelihood that the
contingencies will occur and that the controversy is a real one should be
decisive in determining whether an actual controversy exists.”). The
imminence issue remains. However, the continuing expenditure of funds on a
project which may turn out to be unusable should satisfy this requirement, as
this Note argues later.
122. See supra note 115.
123. Cat Tech LLC v. TubeMaster, Inc., 528 F.3d 871, 878 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
124. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Norton Co., 929 F.2d 670, 673 (Fed. Cir.
1991).
125. See supra notes 2334 and accompanying text for a description of
these cases.
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abandoned. This is not a social benefit.
It is true that to take jurisdiction too far in the opposite
direction would run afoul of Article III standing. As the Third
Circuit stated, “[i]t is obvious that a person not now engaged in
possible infringing conduct, and having no immediate intention
of doing so, but having an academic interest in the law of
patents, could not obtain a declaratory judgment against a
patentee as to the validity or scope of the patent.”126 It is not
socially desirable for a competitor to be able to challenge
patents at will without having a financial or business interest
in the result. However, Lang, Duhn Oil Tool, and Shaunnessey
do not involve the problem of a gratuitous challenge to a
competitor’s patent. In all three of the above examples, a
significant investment had been made in the potentially
infringing product. In Lang, a ship’s hull had been
substantially finished.127 In Duhn Oil Tool, design had been
completed.128 In Shaunnessey, design had been begun, and the
product had been shown to potential customers.129 When a
plaintiff has put a substantial investment into a product and
finds his way blocked by the uncertain legal rights of others, he
should not be prevented from clarifying his position by an
overly restrictive jurisdictional doctrine.
Another consideration weighing in favor of an easier
declaratory judgment jurisdictional standard is what some
claim is a proliferation of questionable patents. The FTC has
highlighted this development as one of the more significant
concerns surrounding the patent system.130 Patents may be
questionable for one of two reasons: either because they are
invalid or because they are overly broad.131 Such patents
represent a social cost insofar as they “reduce competition in
the covered market [because licensing fees may present an
126. Dewey & Almy Chem. Co. v. Am. Anode, Inc., 137 F.2d 68, 70 (3d Cir.
1943).
127. Lang v. Pac. Marine and Supply Co., 895 F.2d 761, 764 (Fed. Cir.
1990).
128. Duhn Oil Tool, Inc. v. Cooper Cameron Corp., No. 1:05-cv-01411OWW-GSA, 2007 WL 3335008, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2007).
129. Shaunessey v. Monteris Med., Inc., 554 F. Supp. 2d 1321, 1326–27
(M.D. Fla. 2008).
130. Rachel Krevans & Daniel P. Munio, Restoring the Balance: The
Supreme Court Joins the Patent Reform Movement, 9 SEDONA CONF. J. 15, 25
(2008).
131. Id. at 24.
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unreasonable barrier to entry] and [deter] follow-on innovation
[because development of products which build on and enhance
the technology covered by a patent will probably involve the
covered technology itself].”132 Allowing plaintiffs to challenge
the validity or breadth of patents more easily will provide
another avenue for the removal of these questionable patents
from the system.133
This argument is bolstered by the fact that a large
proportion of the patents challenged turn out to be invalid or
non-infringed.134 As one commentator states: “[T]he owners of
invalid patents can capture supracompetitive profits during the
time before their patents are invalidated, profits made at the
expense of consumers and that they will never have to disgorge.
That extra profit, in turn, would create significant incentives to
obtain and enforce dubious patents.”135 Thus, there is a
powerful incentive to patent, even if the patent turns out to be
weak, and such an incentive poses a social cost. Allowing a
plaintiff to easily challenge patents before the patents hinder
the plaintiff’s work significantly reduces this cost.
E. A REASONABLE ALTERNATIVE.
How should courts decide when to grant declaratory
judgment in these cases? Any alternative standard will, of
course, still have to respect the basic tenets of Article III
standing, which require an actual case or controversy.136 A
standard which minimizes lost investment in ultimately

132. Id.
133. Krevans & Munio mention the possibility that MedImmune will have
the following effect:
[T]he Court’s decision in MedImmune may also help to reduce the
volume of questionable patents in effect. MedImmune clears the way,
on a jurisdictional level, for use of the “pay and sue” strategy by
licensees. Under this approach, a licensee eliminates the risk of being
sued for infringement by paying royalties under the license, while
simultaneously attacking the underlying patent’s validity. . . .
MedImmune makes it easier for interested parties to challenge
questionable patents. Removing such patents from circulation, if
indeed they are invalid, benefits the industry to which they pertain
and the economy at large.
Id. at 28.
134. See Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV 19, 27
(2008).
135. Id. at 28.
136. U.S. CONST. art III, § 2.
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infringing products, however, can still accomplish this. Instead
of requiring the heretofore narrowly defined “immediacy” and
“reality” test, courts should simply look at whether all the
circumstances indicate that the declaratory judgment plaintiff
has made a prima facie showing that he intends to produce a
product which may be accused of infringement by the
declaratory judgment defendant. Such an approach will allow
courts to determine when a party has expended sufficient
resources in the development of the product to render the
dispute non-hypothetical. Also, it will not shut the courthouse
door to plaintiffs who are being forced to choose between
“pursuing arguably illegal behavior or abandoning that which
[they claim] a right to do.”137
IV. CONCLUSION
The second prong of the Federal Circuit’s reasonable
apprehension of suit test suffered from unreasonable
formalism, an overly restrictive view of Article III standing,
and a conflation of jurisdictional and discretionary analyses.
This led to undesirable effects, and plaintiffs were precluded
from litigating their rights before making a substantial
investment in questionable products. In addition, the difficulty
of getting into court to litigate potentially invalid patents led to
an incentive to apply for and enforce these patents. After the
MedImmune decision, there is reason to hope that the Federal
Circuit will lower this standard.
If this occurs, it will have the effect of bringing cases into
the system sooner, and may increase the number of patent
cases adjudicated by federal courts. It may also provide a less
clear guide concerning whether an actual case or controversy is
presented. In the vast majority of circumstances, however, the
fact that a party will shortly be offering for sale a product that
may infringe another’s patent will more than satisfy the
standing criteria. Courts should easily be able to spot those
that do not. The end result will be fairer and will strengthen,
not weaken, the patent system.

137. SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372, 1381 (Fed.
Cir. 2007).

